Florida State University College of Law

Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
2014

How do the Courts Create Popular Legitmacy?: The Role of
Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through
Just Procedures
Justin Sevier
Florida State University College of Law

Tom R. Tyler

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Law Commons, and the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Justin Sevier and Tom R. Tyler, How do the Courts Create Popular Legitmacy?: The Role of Establishing
the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1095 (2014),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/123

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

1095_TYLER AND SEVIER (DO NOT DELETE)

10/8/2014 1:02 AM

HOW DO THE COURTS CREATE POPULAR LEGITIMACY?:
THE ROLE OF ESTABLISHING THE TRUTH, PUNISHING
JUSTLY, AND/OR ACTING THROUGH JUST PROCEDURES
Tom R. Tyler* & Justin Sevier**
I. INTRODUCTION
When legal authorities evaluate the courts, their focus has
traditionally been upon the degree to which the courts achieve two
distinct objectives: establishing the truth and punishing justly.
These two goals are not, of course, unrelated, since establishing the
truth is often viewed as a precursor to determining just
punishments. A first concern of the system is with using the courts
to draw upon investigative reports and evidence presented during
trials to establish the facts of the case, that is, to determine as well
as possible what actually happened. These facts in turn address the
second concern of the courts: justly punishing wrongdoing. Hence,
establishing truth and achieving substantive justice in punishment
are two goals of the courts and are central to their evaluation by
legal authorities and scholars. To determine how well the courts
achieve these objectives, scholars examine the frequency of
erroneous verdicts1 and of punishments departing from objective
standards of substantive justice.2
A parallel social science literature considers the role of
perceptions—about the degree to which court proceedings establish
* Tom Tyler is Macklin-Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Yale
University. Ph.D. in psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D. (1978).
** Associate Research Scholar, Yale Law School. Visiting Assistant Professor, University
of Illinois (2010-2012); Ph.D. in psychology, Yale (expected 2015); J.D., Harvard (2006).
1 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 6–13 (2011).
2 See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104–42 (1998). Achieving substantive justice involves determining
applicable laws, finding appropriate types of punishment, and applying general legal
concepts, such as state of mind, reasonableness, or foreseeability to the facts determined in
the case. Cf. Nicholas Faso, Civil Disobedience in the Supreme Court: Retroactivity and the
Compromise Between Formal and Substantive Justice, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2012)
(―Substantive justice . . . involves a value judgment about the content of the law and its
consequences.‖).
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truth and deliver substantive justice—on public support for the
courts.3 This literature considers the views of members of the
public about the frequency of inaccurate verdicts,4 and the degree to
which judicial punishments depart from public perceptions about
substantive justice.5
These public views are then typically
connected to the popular legitimacy of the courts. This literature
considers the influence of these issues upon public perceptions
rather than evaluations of objective reality.
Two models of popular legitimacy are developed and contrasted in
this analysis. Their validity is then tested using the results of a
national survey of the American public. The first model links
popular legitimacy to the attainment of the goals of establishing
truth and punishing justly. The courts are expected to be viewed as
legitimate to the degree that they achieve these objectives. This
goal-based model is contrasted with a second model, one which
focuses upon the perceived fairness of court procedures. The second
model argues that by exercising legal authority through procedures
that people see as fair, the courts gain legitimacy and popular
support from the public. This model is based upon the now
substantial empirical literature linking popular legitimacy to public
judgments about the procedural justice of the courts.6
Beyond examining the influence of perceptions of procedural
justice on popular legitimacy, this analysis will contrast two
arguments about why procedural justice might be important in
shaping popular legitimacy. The first argument is that the public
views about the use of fair procedures are linked to the attainment
of truth and substantive justice. From this perspective people’s
widely demonstrated interest in the fairness of judicial procedures
supports a goal attainment perspective on popular legitimacy.
People use information about the fairness of court procedures to
estimate the likelihood that the courts have determined the truth
and punished justly.

3 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 653, 668–685 (2007).
4 See Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens‟ Perceptions of the Criminal
Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 336–51
(1988).
5 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD
BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 92–93 & n.165 (2008); PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL,
LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 13–
15 (2006).
6 E.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW passim (2006).
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An alternative model suggests that procedural justice is not
influential because the public connects the use of fair procedures to
the establishment of truth and/or the attainment of substantive
justice. Rather, the influence of procedural justice is linked to
relational mechanisms linked to the enactment of procedural
justice. The relational model argues that people value the use of
fair procedures because those procedures carry messages of status
and inclusion which reinforce people’s identification with legal
institutions and authorities and support their feelings of inclusion
and status in the community. This then leads to high self-worth
and favorable self-esteem. When people can present their concerns
to judicial authorities and feel that those authorities consider and
take account of their concerns, people’s identification with law and
legal authorities is strengthened. This is true both when people are
in court and when they think about what they think would happen
if they were to go to court. This relational influence is distinct from
the influence of goal-based judgments on popular legitimacy. In
other words, it is not linked to the belief that fair procedures lead to
accurate verdicts or just sentences.
In this study these two models—the goal based model and the
relational model—are compared using the results of a nationally
representative survey of Americans. The results of this comparison
suggest substantial support for the relational perspective on
popular legitimacy. To some degree court legitimacy is linked to the
attainment of truth and the enactment of just punishments and
using fair procedures is important because it is viewed as leading to
these goals. However, the strongest effect of procedural justice is a
direct influence of public views about the procedural justice of the
courts upon popular court legitimacy. And further, as would be
predicted by a relational model, that influence flows most strongly
from the interpersonal component of procedural justice—that is,
from judgments about the degree to which courts and judges are
trustworthy and feel concern for members of the public—rather
than being linked to how fairly the courts are seen as making
decisions (i.e., to the degree to which they allow voice and exercise
neutrality/impartiality in making decisions).
These findings support a relational perspective on legitimacy and
hence suggest the centrality of issues of inclusion and recognition in
the relationship between the public and the courts. By recognizing
people and their concerns and through being viewed as including
the public among those who have status in the eyes of the court,
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relational links are created and strengthened. These links in turn
lead to legitimacy and cooperation, since people are motivated to
accept and voluntarily defer to legal authority.
In addition, the courts gain further popular legitimacy when they
achieve two key public goals for the courts: determining truth and
punishing justly. This study suggests that public beliefs that the
courts establish truth and punish justly are both important to
legitimacy. Interestingly, these two influences are separate and
establishing truth does not build legitimacy because it is viewed as
leading to substantive justice.7 Instead, it does so separately. The
results of this study suggest that public views about the degree to
which the courts establish truth is the more important factor in
shaping legitimacy when compared to how frequently they are
viewed as sentencing justly. Further, the goals of truth and
substantive justice are linked in the public mind to different aspects
of fair procedures. Fair decision making is linked to delivering
substantive justice; fair treatment to accuracy in verdicts.
II. SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE
Traditionally, treatments of popular reactions to adjudication
treat just punishment as the ultimate goal of a trial, with truth
being an antecedent to the pursuit of substantive justice. People
have a fundamental desire to feel that there is just punishment in
response to wrongdoing.8 A core feature of organized groups is that
they create rules and enforce those rules by punishing those who
break them.9 While societies differ widely in what their rules are
and in how they punish those who transgress, punishment for rule
breaking is central to the maintenance of social order and is found
in all societies.10 The nature of these punishments and when they
are enacted is the central focus of the study of retributive justice,
which involves the principles defining appropriate punishments for
wrongdoing.11
7 For an argument that these issues are connected, see Michael Asimow, Popular Culture
and the American Adversarial Ideology, in 7 LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 606, 609–10
(Michael Freeman ed., 2005).
8 Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for
Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 297 (2002).
9 See Ronald J. Rychlak, Society‟s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 303–05 (1990).
10 See id.
11 Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice, 40
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 194 (2008).
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It is a general characteristic of social relationships and organized
groups that formal or informal rules develop that define appropriate
conduct. When such rules are violated, people feel the need to
punish rule violators and this motivation does not only involve
those personally harmed by wrongdoing. Studies of retributive
justice demonstrate that people are motivated to punish those who
break rules and will incur personal costs to uphold social rules, even
when they are not the victims of the rule breaking behavior.12
A beginning element in reacting to rule breaking is an effort to
restore the prior material balance between people. The simplest
way to do so is to right a wrong by compensating the victim(s) for
harm done. When people react to rule breaking which is judged to
be unintentional or without malice, and where it is possible to do so,
people often endorse such an approach to righting wrongs.
However, when people are viewed as having deliberately broken
rules, either intentionally or because of negligence, their victims
and society more generally are found to feel that some type of
punishment beyond compensating victims is appropriate.13 If
someone hits a person, they do not just hit them back, they hit them
harder, reflecting an additional punishment for rule breaking.
Studies exploring the nature of the motivation to punish often
link punishment to issues of deterrence and incapacitation.14 It is
argued that people punish to prevent future wrongdoing.15 Other
studies suggest that the desire for revenge is a key issue.16 Recent
studies have suggested that, on the contrary, people’s primary
reason for punishing is to uphold societal values.17 Rule breaking is
viewed as a threat to those values, and appropriate punishment
restores the integrity of those values. A consequence of this view is
that those people whose actions and demeanor show a defiance of or
disrespect for society, social values, and/or the social status of their
victims are both more likely to be punished, and likely to be
punished more severely. How does this desire to punish wrongdoers
relate to the search for truth? In the legal system itself, truth is
seen as a precursor to establishing just punishment. In the popular

See Carlsmith et al., supra note 8, at 297.
See John M. Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and
Retributive Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324, 327–28 (2003).
14 E.g., ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 75–83, 110–12.
15 E.g., id. at 75, 110–12.
16 See, e.g., Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 11, at 197.
17 See, e.g., Rychlak, supra note 9, at 331–32.
12
13
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mind the relationship between truth and punishment is less clear.
The punishment literature suggests that appropriate punishment
(i.e., punishment linked to an accurate understanding of the wrong
committed) is important, but shows equally clearly that people’s
desire to see justice done sometimes leads to loose or even
nonexistent standards of truth, leading to the punishment of
scapegoats who may have at best a marginal relationship to the
wrongdoing in question. More particularly, people do not always
see the procedures that best attain the goals of truth and justice as
being the same. Hence, feeling that justice has been done can be
viewed as a distinct goal from finding truth.
The separation of justice from truth is inherent in the uncertainty
associated with trials. It is unusual for fact finders to know the
truth. Defendants deny guilt, and witnesses and evidence are
contradictory and confusing. Hence, truth is typically uncertain.
Yet decision makers must dispense punishment. Hence, justice is
done in the face of uncertainty about truth. Given this fundamental
point it is easy to see how standards of truth could vary depending
upon the motivation to feel that substantive justice has been done
because someone has been punished for a crime.
III. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Recent social science research suggests that subjective judgments
about the procedural justice of the courts play a central role in
public evaluations of the legitimacy of the courts.18 In other words,
people are strongly influenced by whether or not they feel that the
court system and its authorities exercise their legal authority in fair
ways. The same studies further demonstrate that such popular
legitimacy is important because it shapes deference to legal
authorities, cooperation with and support for legal authorities, as
well as everyday compliance with the law.19
While the courts have long recognized the importance of
exercising legal authority through procedures that, on objective
grounds, are fair,20 discussions of perceived procedural fairness are
more recent. The roots of the application of ideas of subjective

See TYLER, supra note 6, at 8, 105.
See id. at 161.
20 See D.J. GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES 204–05 (1996).
18
19
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procedural justice lie in the work of Thibaut and Walker.21 These
authors both articulate a theory of perceived procedural justice and
establish its importance through a program of experimental
research. Their work has inspired a large body of research on the
police, the courts, and corrections that continues to this day. That
research demonstrates both the value and the viability of a new
strategy for exercising judicial authority based upon a selfregulatory approach. This new strategy focuses upon building and
maintaining popular legitimacy as a way of encouraging the
acceptance of judicial authority, heightening deference, lowering the
rate of long-term noncompliance and enhancing public willingness
to cooperate with the courts in fighting crime by, for example, being
a juror or a witness when the courts are prosecuting criminals.
Studies link judgments about procedural justice directly to a
variety of law related behaviors, including immediate decision
acceptance or rejection;22 decision adherence over time;23 rule

21 See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS passim (1975).
22 See JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE: COERCIVE AND
PROCEDURALLY JUST TACTICS 30 (2003); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 55 (2002); John C. Besley,
Public Engagement and the Impact of Fairness Perceptions on Decision Favorability and
Acceptance, 32 SCI. COMM. 256, 257–63 (2010); Christine E.W. Bond & David John Gow,
Policing the Beat: The Experience in Toowoomba, Queensland, in POLICING FOR PREVENTION:
REDUCING CRIME, PUBLIC INTOXICATION AND INJURY 153, 161 (Ross Homel ed., 1997);
Mengyan Dai et al., Procedural Justice During Police-Citizen Encounters: The Effects of
Process-Based Policing on Citizen Compliance and Demeanor, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 159, 159–61
(2011); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural
Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 224–31 (1993); Stephen D. Mastrofski
et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public‟s Response to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 269, 269–80 (1996); Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Police Disrespect Toward
the Public: An Encounter-Based Analysis, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 519, 519–22 (2002); Kristina
Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The Mediating Role of
Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 652–55 (2008); Alex R. Piquero et al., Discerning
Unfairness Where Others May Not: Low Self-Control and Unfair Sanction Perceptions, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 699–711 (2004); Clifford Stott et al., „Keeping the Peace‟: Social Identity,
Procedural Justice and the Policing of Football Crowds, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 381, 381–83
(2012); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 233–38 (2008); Jeffrey
T. Ward et al., Caught in Their Own Speed Trap: The Intersection of Speed Enforcement
Policy, Police Legitimacy, and Decision Acceptance, 14 POLICE Q. 251, 252–57 (2011); Amy C.
Watson & Beth Angell, The Role of Stigma and Uncertainty in Moderating the Effect of
Procedural Justice on Cooperation and Resistance in Police Encounters with Persons with
Mental Illnesses, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 30, 30–33 (2013); Tom R. Tyler et al., Street
Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men‟s Legal Socialization,
1–5 (Yale Law School, Public Working Paper No. 302, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2289244; ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL.,
THE INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW
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breaking behavior;24 well-being and recovery;25 and cooperation with
the police, courts, and school officials.26
Further research demonstrates that public judgments about the
legitimacy of the courts and the police are linked to the perceived
procedural justice of their policies and practices. If legal authorities
are believed to be exercising their authority fairly, they gain
legitimacy. This basic relationship has been repeatedly confirmed
in studies of interactions among the courts,27 the police28 and the

JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 70–71 (1988), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3676.pdf.
23 See Robert E. Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Parents‟
Satisfaction and Functioning One Year After Settlement, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 124, 124 (1994).
24 See David M. Bierie, Procedural Justice and Prison Violence: Examining Complaints
Among Federal Inmates (2000–2007), 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 15, 15–19 (2013); Anthony
E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in Prisons, 26 CRIME & JUST. 205, 205–
13 (1999); Michael R. Brubacher et al., Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Disputes:
Implications for Childhood Bullying, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 149, 149–55 (2009);
Michael D. Reisig & Gorazd Mesko, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Prisoner Misconduct,
15 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 41, 41–45 (2009); Joseph R. Tatar II et al., Perceptions of Procedural
Justice Among Female Offenders: Time Does Not Heal All Wounds, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 268, 268–71 (2012); Alan J. Tomkins et al., An Experiment in the Law: Studying a
Technique to Reduce Failure to Appear in Court, 48 CT. REV. 96, 96–98 (2012); Tyler et al.,
Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men‟s Legal
Socialization, supra note 22, at 8–11; Heathcote W. Wales et al., Procedural Justice and the
Mental Health Court Judge‟s Role in Reducing Recidivism, 33 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 265,
265–67 (2010); CYNTHIA G. LEE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A COMMUNITY COURT
GROWS IN BROOKLYN: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE
CENTER 1–4 (2013), http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/A-CommunityCourt-Grows-in-Brooklyn.pdf; LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., AUSTL. FED. POLICE & AUSTL.
NAT’L UNIV., EXPERIMENTS IN RESTORATIVE POLICING: A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE
CANBERRA REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING EXPERIMENTS (RISE) i–iv (1998), http://www.aic.gov.au/
media_library/aic/rjustice/rise/progress/1998.pdf.
25 See JO-ANNE M. WEMMERS, DUTCH RESEARCH & DOCUMENTATION CTR., VICTIMS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (1996); Sarah Kopelovich et al., Procedural Justice in Mental
Health Courts: Judicial Practices, Participant Perceptions, and Outcomes Related to Mental
Health Recovery, 36 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 113, 113–14 (2013); Jo-Anne Wemmers, Victims‟
Experiences in the Criminal Justice System and Their Recovery from Crime, 19 INT’L REV.
VICTIMOLOGY 221, 221–23 (2013).
26 See Eve M. Brank et al., Will They Tell? Weapons Reporting by Middle-School Youth, 5
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 125, 125–26 (2007); Denise C. Gottfredson et al., How Drug
Treatment Courts Work: An Analysis of Mediators, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 3–11 (2007);
Anne Gregory & Rhona S. Weinstein, The Discipline Gap and African Americans: Defiance or
Cooperation in the High School Classroom, 46 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 455, 455–59 (2008); Lindsey
E. Wylie et al., Assessing School and Student Predictors of Weapons Reporting, 8 YOUTH
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 351, 351–57 (2010); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 22, at 262–63; Tyler et
al., supra note 22, at 9.
27 See STEPHEN SHUTE ET AL., A FAIR HEARING?: ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS 71–78 (2005); Ben Bradford, Voice, Neutrality and Respect: Use of Victim Support
Services, Procedural Fairness and Confidence in the Criminal Justice System, 11
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 345, 346, 362 (2011); Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E.
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public. And, again, studies that directly compare the police and the
courts suggest that procedural justice underlies legitimacy with
both authorities.29
Legitimacy in turn is linked to desirable law related behavior.
The first concern of the courts is with public acceptance of their role
as the authorities responsible for maintaining order. This involves
empowering the courts to manage legal problems and accepting

Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents‟ Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody
Dispute Resolution, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 554–63 (1993); Avishalom Tor et al.,
Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL LEGAL STUD.
97, 109 (2010); RASHIDA ABUWALA & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE
EFFECTS OF THE HARLEM HOUSING COURT ON TENANT PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 15 (2008),
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Harlem_Housing_Court_Study.pdf; DONALD
J. FAROLE, JR., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE RESIDENTS SURVEY: PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF NEW YORK’S COURTS 16–17 (2007), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/
default/files/documents/NYS_Residents_Survey.pdf.
28 See TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 56–57; TYLER, supra note 6, at 63; WEMMERS, supra
note 25, at 198; Kimberly Belvedere et al., Explaining Suspect Resistance in Police-Citizen
Encounters, 30 CRIM. JUST. REV. 30, 33–42 (2005); Irina Elliott et al., Procedural Justice in
Contacts with the Police: The Perspective of Victims of Crime, 13 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 437,
438–46 (2012); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, ―One Question Before You Get Gone . . .”:
Consent Search Requests as a Threat to Perceived Stop Legitimacy, 2 RACE & JUST. 250, 268
(2012); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance
Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men‟s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255,
256–57, 262–73 (2010); Badi Hasisi & David Weisburd, Going Beyond Ascribed Identities: The
Importance of Procedural Justice in Airport Security Screening in Israel, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
867, 885–86 (2011); Lyn Hinds, Building Police-Youth Relationships: The Importance of
Procedural Justice, 7 YOUTH JUST. 195, 195–203 (2007); Lyn Hinds & Kristina Murphy,
Public Satisfaction with Police: Using Procedural Justice to Improve Police Legitimacy, 40
AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28–39 (2007); Lyn Hinds, Youth, Police Legitimacy
and Informal Contact, 24 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 10, 10–19 (2009); Tal Jonathan-Zamir
& David Weisburd, The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of Police Legitimacy:
Findings from a Quasi-Experiment in Israel, 50 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 4–20 (2013);
Tammy Rinehart Kochel, Can Police Legitimacy Promote Collective Efficacy?, 29 JUST. Q. 384,
386–414 (2012); Lorraine Mazerolle et al., Shaping Citizen Perceptions of Police Legitimacy: A
Randomized Field Trial of Procedural Justice, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 33, 40–55 (2013); Andy
Myhill & Ben Bradford, Can Police Enhance Public Confidence by Improving Quality of
Service? Results from Two Surveys in England and Wales, 22 POLICING & SOC’Y 397, 398–419
(2012); Jennifer Norman, Seen and Not Heard: Young People‟s Perceptions of the Police, 3
POLICING 364, 365–71 (2009); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice
and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 passim
(2003); Ralph B. Taylor & Brian A. Lawton, An Integrated Contextual Model of Confidence in
Local Police, 15 POLICE Q. 414 passim (2012); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 22, at 264; Tom R.
Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions
of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253 passim (2004); Tom R.
Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority
Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 passim
(2001); Michael D. Reisig et al., Compliance with the Law in Slovenia: The Role of Procedural
Justice and Police Legitimacy, EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. (published online 2013),
http://link.springer.com/journal/10610.
29 See TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 206–07.
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their discretionary decisions about how to enforce the law. When
people have disputes or conflicts with others they can either turn to
the legal system, for redress, or they can engage in private
vengeance. Studies show that people are more likely to defer to the
courts concerning conflict management and rule enforcement if they
believe the courts and the law are legitimate.30 A second concern is
with behavior that undermines state institutions or authorities such
as riots and rebellions. Legitimacy also lessens willingness to
engage in such actions.31
Further, those people who view the law as legitimate are more
likely to follow the law in their everyday lives. This includes the
widespread variety of laws that shape people’s behavior: traffic
laws, laws against stealing, regulations against buying illegal
items, laws against drug use, or laws against robbery, murder and
assault. In addition to the general influence of legitimacy on rule
adherence, an additional concern is how people respond when they
have personal interactions with the courts or the police. People can
either comply with judicial decisions and directives or they can
resist and avoid them.
A particular problem for legal authorities is that people change
their behavior in the presence of the judge and then revert to their
original behavior when they leave the courthouse, requiring the
courts to deal repeatedly with the same people and problems.
Studies indicate that people are both more likely to obey law and to
accept decisions when they view the courts as legitimate. This
includes ordinary citizens following the laws and accepting
decisions related to rule breaking, disputes and misdemeanors,32

30 See Nicole E. Haas et al., Public Support for Vigilantism, Confidence in Police and Police
Responsiveness, 24 POLICING & SOC’Y 224, 227–35 (2014); Jonathan Jackson et al.,
Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes toward the Acceptability of
Violence, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 479, 479–80, 490–91 (2013); Sunshine & Tyler, supra
note 28, at 534; Justice Tankebe, Self-Help, Policing, and Procedural Justice: Ghanaian
Vigilantism and the Rule of Law, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 245, 247–60 (2009); Tom R. Tyler &
Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating
Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 89 (2014).
31 Ronald Fischer et al., Support for Resistance Among Iraqi Students: An Exploratory
Study, 30 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 169–73 (2008); Katrin Hohl et al., The Effect
of the 2011 London Disorder on Public Opinion of Police and Attitudes Towards Crime,
Disorder, and Sentencing, 7 POLICING 12, 13–20 (2013); Jonathan Jackson et al., supra note
30, at 481, 490–91; Gary LaFree & Nancy A. Morris, Does Legitimacy Matter?: Attitudes
Toward Anti-American Violence in Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 689,
711–12 (2012); Tyler & Jackson, supra note 30, at 89.
32 See, e.g., JONATHAN JACKSON ET AL., JUST AUTHORITY?: TRUST IN THE POLICY IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 12 (2013); TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 107–08; TYLER, supra note
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and criminals involved in felony level behaviors.33 While the focus
of these studies involves both the courts and the police, direct
comparisons of these authorities suggests that the findings of
research on them are similar.34
A. What is Procedural Justice?
What elements of procedures shape the judgments that people make
about the procedures’ fairness? Studies suggest that members of the
public have complex models of procedural justice, often considering eight
or more distinct justice issues when deciding how fair they think a legal
procedure is. Four issues are typically found to be important:
opportunities for participation, a neutral forum, trustworthy
authorities, and treatment with dignity and respect. Blader and
6, at 57; Rebecca M. Chory-Assad & Michelle L. Paulsel, Classroom Justice: Student
Aggression and Resistance as Reactions to Perceived Unfairness, 53 COMM. EDUC. 253, 265
(2004); Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18
SOC. JUST. RES. 217, 236 (2005); Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the
Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1062
(2012); Margaret Levi et al., The Reasons for Compliance with Law, in UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 70, 90 (Ryan Goodman et al., eds., 2012); Brian
C. Martinson et al., Scientists‟ Perceptions of Organizational Justice and Self-Reported
Misbehaviors, 1 J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 51, 61 (2006); Kristina Murphy et al.,
Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective when People Question the
Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 18 (2009); Kristina Murphy, Regulating
More Effectively: The Relationship between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Tax Noncompliance, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 562, 575–76 (2005); Kristina Murphy, The Role of Trust in
Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 203–04
(2004); Reisig et al., supra note 28; Jennifer Stuart et al., Procedural Justice in Family
Conflict Resolution and Deviant Peer Group Involvement Among Adolescents: The Mediating
Influence of Peer Conflict, 37 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 674, 683 (2008); Sunshine & Tyler,
supra note 28, at 535; Tyler & Jackson, supra note 30, at 89; Tom R. Tyler et al.,
Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders‟
Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 553, 568 (2007); Marius van Dijke & Peter Verboon, Trust in Authorities as a
Boundary Condition to Procedural Fairness Effects on Tax Compliance, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
80, 87 (2010); Michael Wenzel, A Letter from the Tax Office: Compliance Effects of
Informational and Interpersonal Justice, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 345, 358 (2006).
33 See, e.g., RICHARD SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 303 (1996);
Jeffrey Fagan & Alex R. Piquero, Rational Choice and Developmental Influences on
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 715, 739–41
(2007); Robert J. Kane, Compromised Police Legitimacy as a Predictor of Violent Crime in
Structurally Disadvantaged Communities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 469, 490–91 (2005); Andrew V.
Papachristos et al., Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 236, 266 (2007); Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Criminology:
Why Do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active
Gun Offenders, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 412, 436 (2012); Michael D. Reisig, Rates
of Disorder in Higher-Custody State Prisons: A Comparative Analysis of Managerial Practices,
44 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 229, 230, 232, 239 (1998); Reisig & Mesko, supra note 24, at 55.
34 TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 175; Tyler & Jackson, supra note 30, at 89.
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Tyler refer to the first two elements as involving the quality of
decision making, while the latter two elements are concerned with
the quality of interpersonal treatment.35
First, people want to participate in decisions about the resolution
of problems or the application of rules. When dealing with
authorities this typically means that people want to have an
opportunity to explain their situation or tell their side of the story
before decisions are made and outcomes determined.
This
opportunity to make arguments and present evidence should occur
before the police or judges make decisions about what to do. People
are interested in having an opportunity to tell their story, that is,
they want to have a voice.
Second, people react to evidence that the authorities with whom
they are dealing are neutral. This requires an explanation for the
process and accountability in terms of the rules used to make
decisions. Neutrality involves authorities making decisions based
upon consistently applied legal principles and the facts of the case,
not personal opinions and biases. Transparency or openness about
what the rules and procedures are and how decisions are being
made facilitates the belief that decision making procedures are
neutral when it reveals that decisions are being made in rule based
and unbiased ways. If, for example, the police have a policy of stops
to search cars for guns, they explain to the people they stop what
that policy is and the reasons the police have adopted it. When
judges apply the law and make decisions, they explain what laws
are being used and how they apply.
Third, people want to have their status as human beings and
members of the political community acknowledged. Since quality of
treatment is a statement about status, people are sensitive to
whether they are treated with dignity and politeness, and to
whether their rights as members of the community are respected.
The issue of interpersonal treatment consistently emerges as a key
factor in reactions to dealings with legal authorities. People believe
that they are entitled to treatment with respect and react very
negatively to dismissive or demeaning interpersonal treatment.
Finally, people focus on cues that communicate information about
the intentions and character of the legal authorities with whom

35 Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice:
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 748, 757
(2003).
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they are dealing.
This involves inferences of integrity,
trustworthiness, and good faith. People react favorably to the
judgment that the authorities with whom they are interacting are
benevolent and caring, and are sincerely trying to do what is best
for the people with whom they are dealing.
Authorities
communicate this type of concern when they listen to people’s
accounts and explain or justify their actions in ways that show an
awareness of and sensitivity to people’s needs and concerns. In
discussions about whether or not to accept a directive from a legal
authority each of these concerns is typically more important in decisions
than are assessments of the fairness or favorability of the decision
itself.36
Of these four elements, the first two—giving people voice and
using neutral rules when making decisions—have been associated
with attaining the goal of substantive justice. Allowing voice and
making rule based impartial decisions lead to appropriate findings
of fact and encourage punishing justly. The latter two elements,
respect and trust, are relational issues and have been associated
with the influence of procedures upon the social connection between
people and authorities.37 They reflect the influence of court
proceedings upon understandings of inclusion and status, and hence
directly speak to the potential of wrongdoing to injure the status of
victims or others in society.
IV. TRUTH AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE
How do procedural justice findings relate to establishing the truth
and enacting substantive justice in punishment for wrongdoing?
Procedural justice findings suggest that using fair procedures
benefits legal authorities in a variety of ways. However, procedural
justice research has not generally addressed the degree to which it
is important to the public to believe that the courts reach accurate
verdicts and/or punish offenders appropriately. It is not clear
whether procedures matter because people think that the use of fair
procedures enhances the likelihood of achieving these objectives.
While procedural justice assessments concern evaluations of how

TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 90.
TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 89–90 (2000); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L.
Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative
Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349, 351–52 (2003).
36
37
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the court exercises authority they are not necessarily linked to
either the accuracy of verdicts or the appropriateness of
punishments.
There are two issues underlying this question. The first is
whether the pursuit of truth and enactment of substantive justice
are viewed by people as the same, that is, is attaining truth related
to the substantive justice of punishments? The second is whether
either of these issues is connected by the public to evaluations of the
procedural fairness of the courts and through such judgments to
evaluations about court legitimacy.
A. Truth and Justice: The Same?
As has been noted, it would be natural to assume that people
value fair procedures because they view them as leading to accurate
verdicts and/or to the appropriate punishment of wrongdoing. This
assumption guides at least some of the early procedural justice
research of Thibaut and Walker on adversarial versus inquisitorial
trial procedures.38 Thibaut and Walker argue that the adversarial
system is more likely to produce truth and lead to justice.39 It is
also the system most likely to be viewed by litigants as procedurally
just and by implication legitimate.40
In their studies, Thibaut and Walker first demonstrate that the
effects of prior bias on verdicts are better eliminated by the
adversarial procedure.41 In experiments they first create pre-trial
bias and then conduct an adversarial or inquisitorial trial
concerning a particular case.42 They find that the influence of prior
bias upon post-trial verdicts is less when the trial is adversarial.43
Based upon this finding they suggest that the use of adversary
procedures is associated with actual accuracy, as well as flowing
from the trial procedure that people evaluate as being the fairest,
which is also the adversary system.44
While this argument would initially seem reasonable, it is itself
inconsistent with another aspect of Thibaut and Walker’s research
findings. In a different experimental framework they show that the
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 21, at 39–40.
See id. at 119.
See id. at 77.
See id. at 49.
See id. at 42–45.
See id. at 49.
See id. at 118.
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adversarial system leads to a distribution in the presentation of
facts in a trial that does not accurately reflect the totality of the
facts in the underlying case. In particular they demonstrate that
the proportion of evidence presented at a trial favors the
disadvantaged party under the adversarial model, while under the
inquisitorial model the evidence presented accurately mirrors the
―true‖ nature of the actual evidence.45 Although Thibaut and
Walker present this feature of the adversarial model as desirable, it
also indicates that the model is not associated with attaining truth,
if truth flows from having the underlying mix of the ―true‖ evidence
accurately presented during the trial. In this situation, therefore
the same ―fair‖ adversarial procedure is potentially associated with
inaccuracy.
The model articulated by Thibaut and Walker additionally
suggests that the adversarial system is the most likely to deliver
just punishments.46 While this aspect in their model is not tested
empirically, their theoretical model suggests that adversarial
procedures are viewed by people as fairer in part because they
increase the likelihood that the decision maker will make an
appropriate substantive decision, that is, will punish appropriately.
According to their model, the litigant’s goal in a trial is to provide
evidence to the decision maker in an effort to shape his/her verdict,
not to win, but to see that that verdict represents a fair outcome
(―distributive‖ or ―substantive‖ justice).47 The adversarial trial
provides the best chance to do that because the litigant controls the
presentation of evidence. Because they are provided more of an
opportunity to communicate evidence to the decision maker in their
own way, litigants are more likely to be able to present the evidence
that is important, leading to a greater likelihood of a just verdict.
Since Thibaut and Walker argue that adversary procedures lead
to truth and produce substantive justice in terms of punishment,
the goals of attaining truth and realizing substantive justice are
aligned and result from the same procedural choice. Of course, as
has been noted, the issue of which procedure attains truth is more
complex in the Thibaut and Walker paradigm than they
acknowledge, but in the authors’ own terms truth and justice are
aligned and can be pursued using the same procedure. Moreover,

45
46
47

See id. at 40.
Id. at 118.
See id.
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that procedure is viewed as procedurally fair by the people involved.
The findings of research by Austin and Tobiasen suggest a less
clear connection between accuracy and perceived fairness,
however.48 These authors found that people associate different legal
procedures with the goals of accuracy and justice. They believe that
the adversarial system is most likely to lead to justice, the
inquisitorial system to truth. Having made this distinction, people
then indicate a preference for the adversarial system and,
apparently, for substantive justice over truth.
In their later work on science courts, Thibaut and Walker adopt a
posture that is consistent with these findings.49 They suggest that
the courts adopt a two-stage procedure for resolving science
disputes.50 In stage one the courts would use an inquisitorial
procedure to achieve truth. In stage two, subsequent to and based
upon stage one facts, the courts would bring the facts into an
adversarial trial to achieve justice in the courts’ decisions.51
This conception of science courts receives support in the work of
Sevier,52 who found that the American ―adversarial‖ model of
resolving legal disputes—in which a person involved in litigation
hires her own attorney to advocate for her in front of a judge or
jury—is perceived by American litigants as providing more justice
than it does accuracy, whereas the ―inquisitorial‖ model of resolving
legal disputes, favored by foreign countries—in which attorneys
have little control over the flow of evidence and are not hired as
biased advocates by the litigants—is perceived by litigants as more
accurate than it is just.53
Taken as a whole these various studies suggest that it is difficult
to make a clear statement about the relationship among preference
for a judicial procedure (adversarial or inquisitorial); public views
about the fairness of that procedure; public judgments about the
likelihood that a particular procedure will achieve truth; and public
evaluations of the likelihood that a particular procedure will lead to

48 William Austin & Joyce M. Tobiasen, Legal Justice and the Psychology of Conflict
Resolution, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 227, 251–52
(Robert Folger ed., 1984).
49 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV 541, 563 (1978).
50 Id. at 563–65.
51 Id. at 563 & n.68.
52 Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and
Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 212, 220 (2014).
53 See id. at 220.
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appropriate punishments (substantive justice). In particular, these
studies do not explore whether the impact of using procedures that
people view as fair upon legitimacy occurs because the public thinks
either that such fair procedures are more likely to produce truth or
that they are more likely to produce substantive justice or for both
reasons.
B. Procedural Justice and Court Legitimacy
This paper compares the two models outlined, models which
differently describe the connection among procedural justice, truth,
and substantive justice as well as their joint connection to court
legitimacy. The first model is drawn from Thibaut and Walker and
suggests that the impact of procedural justice upon legitimacy
occurs because the public believes that fairer procedures are more
likely to produce truth and lead to substantive justice. A second
model also views procedural justice as important to legitimacy but
not because it is related to either the ability of the courts to
determine truth or to produce substantive justice. Instead, the
value of fair procedures is linked to the relational mechanisms of
procedural justice that underlie at least some procedural justice
influences.
V. RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Procedural justice is potentially valuable to the success of
authorities because it relies upon relational mechanisms. In other
words, its influence is not only related to showing people that
accepting judicial authority is good because it leads to higher
quality outcomes. To an extent, fair procedures matter in the public
calculus because they are associated with truth and substantive
justice, producing a goal-linked influence.
Fair procedures are also influential for relational reasons. When
people are treated fairly by authorities they develop a social
connection with them, identifying with the authority and viewing
the authority as sharing their goals and values. These non-outcome
based connections have been labeled relational bonds and shown to
be a basis for the voluntary acceptance of regulation leading to
enforcement through self-regulation.54 The relational approach to
54 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 27 (1992).
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regulation is based upon a psychological model—the relational
model55—that explains why these elements are effective. Relational
bonds can be created through personal interactions or via general
judgments about the nature of authorities and institutions.
From a motivational point of view relational mechanisms are
especially important when it is difficult to effectively build
legitimacy by producing desired outcomes. Courts are such a
setting since a judge can seldom provide all the parties with what
they want or feel they deserve. Instead, they sometimes have to
deny claims or refuse judgments. Building adherence through
procedural justice principles is particularly useful in such
situations, that is, settings in which outcome based approaches
have been proven insufficient or unfeasible. When people cannot
receive desired outcomes relational mechanisms are vital since they
anchor adherence to a judicial decision, to the type of the
relationship people have with judicial authorities and not to their
pursuit of desired outcomes. The relational elements of fair
procedures direct attention toward those elements of a procedure
that can be experienced by everyone and in conjunction with
winning or losing: respect from authorities and evidence that
authorities are sincere, benevolent and concerned (i.e., trustworthy).
Procedural justice is hence effective in legal settings through its
relational capacity to affirm the social connection between
individuals and authorities and thereby motivate the person to act
based upon identity related motivations, making their evaluation of
their outcome secondary to their acceptance decision.
The advantage of bringing disputes to the courts is that judicial
authorities are more neutral and disinterested. So they can more
effectively overcome the problems of self-interested motivation that
make it difficult for the parties involved in a dispute to implement
distributive justice rules and create acceptable agreements or for
those who feel wronged to determine appropriate punishments.
Judges are also less emotionally involved and can make better
decisions about suitable resolutions to disputes and punishments
for rule breaking.
A neutral authority can establish the principles defining a fair
sentence.
And having a clear standard of right and wrong
articulated by an authority encourages the parties to accept this

55 Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 139–43 (1992).
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punishment. This is true of the perpetrator, the victim, and the
community. Hence, having a third party authority facilitate a
socially superior form of resolution to that which occurs when
private parties seek vengeance—that is, establishment of judicially
appropriate punishment—is less likely to create bad feeling and
undermine long-term relationships. People are also less likely to
act upon extralegal motivations of retaliation and revenge when a
legitimate authority is telling them in a clear manner what a fair
punishment is.
Why is it better for the parties not to act on self-serving
motivations but to accept the decisions made by a judge? While
acting on one’s personal views about a dispute and engaging in
vengeance may be psychologically satisfying to one party it
undermines social relationships because it leaves an aggrieved
victim of that revenge, who has family and friends of their own,
even if it is comforting to the original victim. Society favors just
punishment as a way to create closure, so the ability of authorities
to encourage it is desirable. Private actions are also undertaken in
the ―heat of the moment‖ when the truth is still unclear, and they
may not reflect a reasonable level of punishment. Actions taken in
the heat of the moment are often excessive and result in a
motivation to take counteraction, which leads to a cycle of violence.
Further, judges can also use their expertise and experience to
craft just punishments that are more complex and effective than
what parties might develop themselves. These decisions can be
better informed and more thoughtful. Studies suggest that judges
do in fact use their positions to make more complex decisions than
lay parties.56 Hence, it is not surprising that one commonly chosen
approach that groups adopt to determine ―fair‖ approaches to
punishment is to bring their dispute to a court and then let the
judge or other expert decide. This provides a mechanism through
which justice principles can operate in complex situations.57
Consider the recent example of the efforts of Kenneth Feinberg to
allocate resources to the families of the victims of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks; or the people living in the Gulf, whose lives were damaged
by the BP oil spill; or the bankers whose compensation was partially
controlled by the government. In each case an expert developed a
56 See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: Procedural
Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 482, 483–84 (1995).
57 See id. at 484–95.

1095_TYLER AND SEVIER (DO NOT DELETE)

1114

Albany Law Review

10/8/2014 1:02 AM

[Vol. 77.3

complex application of distributive justice rules to determine the
best compensation for those wronged.58
Judicial authorities are valuable as the disinterested and
knowledgeable adjudicators of wrongdoing. They can help to
resolve the problems that occur when interested parties try to
implement rules of fairness in the face of victimization. However,
the introduction of judicial authorities raises the issue of whether
and when people will actually defer to those authorities and view
their decisions as appropriate, right, and proper.
Having
empowered authorities, people have to decide when to view their
decisions as legitimate and accept them. The flip side of judicial
discretion is the possibility of public mistrust. Discretion based
differentiations in sentences for similar crimes, for example, carry
the risk of undermining trust and confidence in authorities,
especially when people suspect the motives that lead to differences
in punishment across individuals. Authorities, in other words, have
to compellingly explain and justify varying sentences based upon
the circumstances of the crime or criminal.
If our concern is with the legitimacy of the courts and their ability
to gain acceptance for more of the complex decisions that they can
provide, the focus should be on the procedural justice of formal and
informal legal procedures because, as noted, studies suggest that
people give legitimacy to authorities when they believe that they
are exercising their authority fairly. This provides an important
indication about how authorities can gain acceptance: they can
provide evidence that they are using fair procedures. And while
procedural justice involves elements of both fair decision making
and elements of fair interpersonal treatment, it is the quality of
treatment which is relational in nature that is especially important
from the point of view of facilitating cooperation.59
The goal-based model emphasizes that fair decision making leads
to higher quality decisions and for this reason may facilitate
decision acceptance. People are more likely to think that truth is
frequently established and substantive justice often achieved, so
they are more likely to support the courts. If, for example, the
authority can determine a fair verdict (truth) and establish
appropriate punishment (substantive justice), the parties are more

58 KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 151–57 (2005).
59 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 55, at 165.
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willing to accept their decisions, and if the public thinks the courts
have these properties they are more likely to defer to the courts,
allowing them to determine fair punishments. In this case,
decisions are accepted because judicial decisions are understood to
be reasonable in that truth has been established and justice
achieved.
The other key to success however, is relational: people are willing
to defer to the solutions judicial authorities propose in part because
the authority acts in ways that validate the parties by showing
respect for their status and standing in the group, displaying
concern for and consideration of their views, and expressing a desire
to do what is right for the people with whom they are dealing.
People therefore feel that the authority is trustworthy, sincere, and
benevolently motivated.60 Relational elements are distinct from the
nature and quality of the decision itself and are a separate aspect of
procedural justice related to the parties’ social link with the
authority. For example, Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler found gains
in the willingness to accept negotiated outcomes that are linked to
the fairness of the negotiation process even though the outcomes
themselves are not materially better.61
The relational element is especially important from the
perspective of society because it enhances the acceptance of the
authorities’ decisions and thereby facilitates cooperation. When a
person cannot receive the outcome they want concerning
punishment of a wrongdoer, they can still feel validated by the
authority in relational terms and this relational basis for exercising
authority is therefore a mechanism that can enhance the level of
cooperation and acceptance when judges face difficult decisions and
cannot give one or both parties outcomes that they will view as
appropriate.
When people have a social link with an authority, the justice of
the procedures the authority uses become the key issue they
consider when deciding whether or not to accept the decisions of
that authority. Such a link can be at the individual level, for
example the connection a person feels with a judge or mediator, and
it can be more institutional, with people identifying with
institutions because of their legitimacy. When people lack such a
See TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 7.
See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
473, 491 (2008).
60
61
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relationship they focus on whether they agree with a third-party
decision. Within people’s procedural justice evaluations, relational
issues in particular are more central.
The stronger the social links between a party and an authority
the more the party’s behavior in relationship to that authority is
shaped by relational as opposed to outcome based issues.
Consequently, part of being an effective authority, judicial or
otherwise, is being able to draw upon social bonds with the parties
who deal with the courts, as well as with the public that observes or
reads about the courts.
These are not necessarily personal
connections but reflect identification on the part of the parties with
the role and institution represented by the judge, the courts, and
the law.
To summarize, relationally based procedural justice is valuable
because it provides a basis for authorities to gain acceptance for
their decisions as well as a mechanism for building institutional
legitimacy. Authorities are neutral and have expertise. They can
use these characteristics to craft more complex justice-based
solutions. But, will those solutions be accepted? The authorities
have to balance their ability to make more complex applications of
justice rules using their discretionary authority against being able
to get acceptance for their decisions both among the parties involved
and people more generally.
How do authorities use justice to legitimate more complex
decisions among all the parties to an interaction? Decisions that
depart from commonsense justice, even if they are more complex
and reflect expertise and experience, are initially likely to be viewed
as unfair by the parties. Studies suggest that the parties defer to
such decisions when they perceive that the authority is acting with
the intention of achieving justice—for example, a relational
concern.62 In other words, the key to effectiveness is that people
have trust in the motives and sincerity of the authority. Authorities
can depart from commonly understood principles of justice when
people support them for relational reasons.
How do authorities communicate trustworthiness and create
trust? Two ways are, first, by explaining what the procedures they
are using are and why they are making the decisions they do and,
second, by acknowledging people’s needs and concerns in those

62 Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC. REV. 103, 129 (1988).
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explanations. To do so it is first important to let people present
their concerns and evidence they feel is relevant so that these can
both be used in making a decision and in justifying it.
Hence, the study of justice in the context of authorities needs to
consider how authorities make their decisions legitimate to all the
parties to a conflict so that they accept them. And of particular
concern in this analysis, does legitimation involve issues of truth
and substantive justice or do relational effects occur outside of any
connection between viewing the courts as using fair procedures,
thinking that they do determine the truth and do punish justly, and
viewing them as legitimate institutions.
Thibaut & Walker argue that a benefit of providing voice is that it
enables authorities to arrive at substantively fair solutions.63
However, their work does not show that it is because people think
that solutions reached through fair procedures are substantively
fairer that they accept them. In their studies, Thibaut and Walker
do not link the perceived substantive fairness of third-party
decisions to their legitimacy and acceptance. Hence, there is a need
to distinguish the issue of producing fair sentences from that of
engaging relational mechanisms and to consider the role of both
mechanisms in producing legitimacy.
These issues are important because they focus on the potential
benefits that accrue from having trained and experienced
authorities who can craft high quality solutions. The ability of
experts to gain deference because of the quality of their decisions is
different from their ability to gain acceptance for decisions via
relational mechanisms. However both are relevant to the benefits
derived from creating and empowering authorities. Americans, in
particular, have a love-hate relationship with experts and expertise
and often seem to feel that the views of the ―average person on the
street‖ are the best basis for action.
VI. THE PRESENT STUDY
The focus of concern in this study is popular legitimacy. Drawing
upon the literature on legitimacy, this study operationalized
popular legitimacy in terms of four elements: the perceived
obligation to obey the courts; trust and confidence in the courts;
judgments about whether the courts follow the law; and the belief

63

See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 21, at 118.
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that legal authorities have the same normative values as the public.
The study also measured legitimacy in terms of two behaviors: the
willingness to testify in trials and the willingness to forego private
vengeance.
This analysis examines the relationship between public
judgments about the degree to which the courts establish truth, the
frequency with which judicial decisions reflect substantive justice in
terms of punishment, the fairness of court procedures, and the
legitimacy of the courts. Those relationships are explored among a
random sample of Americans.
A. Sample Characteristics
Participants for this study were drawn from a panel of
compensated respondents maintained by Knowledge Networks
during August and September 2012.64 Individuals in the panel were
offered the opportunity to complete this survey as part of their longterm commitment to the organization.
The research panel
comprised a probability sample of U.S. residents that was acquired
through random digit dialling and address-based sampling
methodologies of online and offline adults over the age of eighteen.
Selected respondents were contacted by e-mail and provided with a
laptop computer and internet access if needed. For this survey 2561
respondents randomly chosen from the larger ongoing panel of
residents of the United States maintained by Knowledge Networks
were invited to take part in the survey and reminded after three
days.65 Of those who might participate, 1603 individuals completed
the survey either in English or in Spanish, which represented a
62.5% response rate.
The sample was 48% male. Twenty-one percent of respondents
were twenty-nine years of age or younger; 26% of respondents were
between thirty and forty-four years old; 28% of respondents were
between forty-five and fifty years old; and 26% respondents of were
sixty years of age or older. In terms of education, 30% of the sample
had completed some high school or had a high school degree; 29% of
respondents had completed some college; and 29% of respondents

64 Knowledge Networks is a survey research firm, which maintains a panel of respondents
who complete online questionnaires for compensation.
The panel is designed, with
appropriate weighting, to approximate the demographics of the American population. See
KnowledgePanel Design Summary, GFK, 2, http://goo.gl/qhHs2d (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
65 This number was chosen to produce an adequate number of completed questionnaires.
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were college graduates or had received additional education. In
terms of income, 36% of responses had an annual family income
below $40,000; 33% of the sample had an annual family income
between $40,000 and $84,000; and 31% of the sample had an annual
family income $85,000 or more. The sample was 6% Hispanic; 12%
African American; 72% White; and 10% other ethnicity. Finally,
41% of the sample participants were Republican; 55% were
Democratic; and 4% were undecided.
The panel sample is designed to approximate a national sample
and the responses received were weighted to adjust for deviations
from a representative national sample.66 This adjustment involved
weighting respondents’ questionnaires based upon their
demographic characteristics including gender, age, ethnicity,
education, income, region, and primary language. The weighted
sample, which consisted of 1603 participants, should therefore
approximate a representative sample of American adults.67
Each of the participants in the study answered a series of
questions about the courts presented to them on a series of
computer screens. Participants were allowed to complete the survey
in multiple sessions, but could not return to previous questions in
the questionnaire.
B. Participants‟ Responses
We now report the data that we collected from our participants.
The sections that follow list each of the questions that we asked to
our participants and are organized by topic. Participants were
asked their views about (1) certain characteristics of the courts; (2)
their attitudes toward the courts; and (3) their behavior with
respect to the courts.

66 The comparison data is drawn from the Current Population Survey, with Hispanic data
drawn from the 2010 PEW Hispanic Center Survey. See generally Current Population Survey
(CPS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032013/perinc/
toc.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (compiling and making available for download the 2012
CPS data sets); PEW RESEARCH CENTER, HISPANIC TRENDS PROJECT 2010 (Feb. 21, 2010),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/02/PHC-2010-FB-Profile-Final_APR-3.pdf (compiling
data from the 2010 Pew Hispanic Center Survey).
67 A comparison of the sample to 2012 Current Population demographics indicated no
significant deviations. See Current Population Survey, supra note 66. For example, in 2012
the U.S. population was 72% White, and our survey panel was 72% White; the U.S.
population was 51% female, as was the sample; and, in 2010, 37% of the US population was
age eighteen to fourty-four, as was the sample. Id.
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1. Characteristics of Courts
We asked our participants several questions relevant to their
perceptions of certain characteristics of American courts: (1) the
procedural justice produced by the courts; (2) the frequency with
which the courts arrive at correct, true verdicts; and (3) the
substantive justice produced by the courts.
a. The Procedural Justice of the Courts
The first of the characteristics of American courts—the amount of
procedural justice that they produce—can be conceived of in terms
of their decision making and in terms of the fairness of their
interactional treatment of litigants.
We asked participants
questions regarding both of these conceptions of procedural justice.
i. Procedural Justice in Terms of Decision-Making
Participants answered the following four questions using a fourpoint scale, anchored at ―never‖ and ―always.‖ The first question
measured the psychological construct of voice, whereas the
remaining questions measured participants’ perceptions of
neutrality. They were asked how often the courts: (1) ―Give people a
chance to tell their side of the story before they decide what to do‖;
(2) ―Make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal with‖;
(3) ―Explain their decisions and actions in ways that people can
understand‖; and (4) ―Make decisions based upon the law and not
their personal biases or opinions.‖68
ii. Procedural Justice in Terms of the Fairness of Treatment by the
Courts
Participants answered these questions using a four-point scale
(from ―never‖ to ―always‖). The first two questions measured
participants’ perceptions of the amount of respect they had received
and the final two questions measured the degree of trust they have

68 Participants’ responses to these items were strongly correlated.
This correlation is
measured through a ―Cronbach’s alpha‖ statistic, in which a value of 1.0 indicates a perfect
correlation between responses. See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW
299 (2010); Karl Schweizer, On the Changing Role of Cronbach‟s α in the Evaluation of the
Quality of a Measure, 27 EUR. J. PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 143, 143–44 (2011). The Cronbach’s
alpha value for these four items was .84.
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in the courts. The questions specifically asked how often the courts:
(1) ―Treat people with dignity and respect‖; (2) ―Respect people’s
rights‖; (3) ―Try to do what is best for the people they are dealing
with‖; and (4) ―Make decisions that are good for everyone in the
community.‖69
b. Frequency with which the Courts Reach Accurate Verdicts
(Truth)
Participants answered two questions on the same four-point scale
used above. The questions asked how often the courts: (1) ―Make
mistakes and let guilty people go free?‖; and (2) ―Make mistakes and
convict innocent people?‖70
c. Frequency with which the Courts Sentence Appropriately
(Substantive Justice)
Participants were asked five questions on a four-point scale
anchored at ―disagree‖ and ―agree.‖ (1) ―People who break the law
should be given harsher sentences than they currently receive‖; (2)
―I support the death penalty for serious crimes‖; (3) ―The use of
harsh punishments should be avoided as much as possible‖; (4) ―If
prison is used it should be used sparingly and as a last resort‖; (5)
―Whenever possible we should use community service as an
alternative to prison.‖71
2. Court Related Attitudes
We measured our participants’ attitudes toward the courts with
respect to how legitimate they perceive those courts to be.
Legitimacy is a multidimensional psychological construct and so we
measured it as outlined below.

69 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .94, indicating that they were highly
correlated.
70 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .81, indicating that they were highly
correlated.
71 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .73, indicating that they were highly
correlated. Additionally, items three and four were ―reverse scored,‖ whereby the values
associated with moving from ―disagree‖ to ―agree‖ in coding each participants’ responses were
reversed to account for the fact that the items were ―negatively worded‖ questions. The
Cronbach’s alpha value reflects the association among these items after items two, three, and
four were reverse coded. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 299.
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a. Legitimacy of the Courts
The analysis in this section treats legitimacy as a general
summary index that averages participants’ responses to questions
regarding (1) their sense of obligation to obey the courts; (2) their
trust and confidence in the courts; and (3) normative alignment,
which we measured by examining participants’ perceptions of
whether the courts follow the law and whether they share the
public’s values.
i. Legitimacy: Obligation to Obey the Courts
Participants were asked the extent to which: (1) ―You should
support the decisions made by judges even when you disagree with
them‖; (2) ―You should do what judges tell you even if you do not
understand or agree with the reasons‖; (3) ―You should do what
judges tell you even if you do not like how they treat you‖; and (4)
―The courts in your community are legitimate authorities and you
should obey them.‖72
ii. Legitimacy: Trust and Confidence in the Courts
Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or
disagreed that: (1) ―The courts protect the interests of the rich and
powerful above those of ordinary people‖; (2) ―The courts are unduly
influenced by pressure from political parties and politicians‖; (3)
―Judges take bribes‖; (4) ―Judges put people in jail for no good
reason‖; (5) ―Judges make decisions based upon their prejudices or
personal opinions‖; and (6) ―When judges make decisions they
almost always behave according to the law.‖73
iii. Normative Alignment
Do the courts follow the law? Participants were asked the extent
to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement:
―When judges make decisions they almost always behave according
to the law.‖
Do the courts share public values? Participants were asked the
72 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .83, indicating that they were highly
correlated.
73 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .82, indicating that they were highly
correlated. Items one, two, three, four and five were reverse scored.
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extent to which they agreed or disagreed with two statements: (1)
―Judges stand up for the values that are important to you‖; and (2)
―Judges generally have the same sense of right and wrong that you
do.‖74
3. Court Related Behavior
We measured participants’ reports of their behaviors with respect
to the courts by asking them (1) the degree to which they would
help legal actors; (2) the degree to which they would take actions
―outside the law‖; and (3) several questions regarding their actual
experiences with the law, if applicable.
a. Help the Legal System
On a four-point scale ranging from ―very unlikely‖ to ―very likely,‖
participants were asked: (1) ―If you saw someone push a person to
the ground and steal their purse or wallet, how likely would you be
to call the police?‖; (2) ―If you were the only witness, how willing
would you be to identify the person who committed the crime?‖; and
(3) ―If you were the only witness, how likely would you give evidence
in court against the accused?‖75
b. Violence as Revenge and Protest
On a four-point scale ranging from ―very wrong‖ to ―not wrong at
all,‖ participants were asked how wrong it was to take actions
outside the law, specifically the appropriateness of using violence to:
(1) ―Take revenge against someone who has insulted or injured you‖;
(2) ―Resolve a dispute with a neighbor‖; (3) ―Protest against laws or
policies that you think are unjust‖; (4) ―Write or distribute leaflets
encouraging violence against people of different ethnic groups‖; (5)
―Use violence to protest against economic policies‖; and (6) ―Use
violence to promote a particular religion or religious cause.‖76

74 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .88, indicating that they were highly
correlated.
75 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .93, indicating that they were highly
correlated.
76 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .85, indicating that they were highly
correlated.
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c. Personal Experience with the Courts
To determine whether participants had any personal experiences
with the courts over the past two years, we asked them: (1) ―Have
you been a defendant in a court case in which you were accused of a
crime?‖; (2) ―Have you been in court because you were a victim of or
witnessed a crime?‖; and (3) ―Have you been in court because you
went to get help resolving a conflict or to collect money you felt
another person owed you?‖ Six percent of respondents responded
yes to the first question, and 3% of respondents responded yes to the
second question and to the third question. These participants were
then asked additional questions regarding the justice of the
decision-making in their case, the fairness of the way the court
treated them, and the perceived lawfulness of the outcome.
i. Justice of Decision Making
Here, participants were asked, on a five-point scale ranging from
―very unfairly‖ to ―very fairly‖: ―How fairly did the court make
decisions about what to do?‖
ii. Fairness of Interpersonal Treatment
On the same scale, participants were also asked: ―How fairly were
you treated by the court?‖
iii. Lawfulness of Outcome
Finally, on a five-point scale ranging from ―not at all‖ to
―completely,‖ participants were asked: ―To what extent did you
receive the right outcome based upon your understanding of the
law?‖
Because participants’ responses to questions in each subcategory
listed above were highly correlated with each other, we averaged
participants’ responses to questions in each subcategory to create
scales that represent the relevant psychological construct. The next
section analyzes the survey results based on those scales.
VII. RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY
To examine the relationship between the key issues of concern in
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this study, we can first look at the correlation among the variables
measured.77 These correlations are shown in Table 1. First, they
indicate that judgments about whether the courts obtain accuracy
and whether they dispense substantive justice are unrelated.78 The
correlations further suggest that people associate using fair
procedures with both producing more accurate verdicts79 and as
leading to more appropriate sentencing (i.e., substantive justice).80
We can also consider the relationship among different aspects of
popular legitimacy. As shown in Table 2, consideration of their
correlation indicates that legitimacy (as reflected in obligation and
trust/confidence), lawfulness, and shared community values are
interrelated views about the courts. In addition, those who would
help by testifying are also more likely to say that they would not go
outside the law to resolve individual or collective grievances.
Finally, both behaviors are linked to attitudinal expressions of
popular legitimacy.
To examine the basis of public support for the courts we first
examine the influence of procedural justice, verdict accuracy, and
sentence appropriateness upon legitimacy and behavioral support
for the courts. The regression analysis examining that relationship
is shown in Table 3.81 It indicates that the primary judgment
shaping popular legitimacy is the procedural justice of court actions.
The second important factor is the accuracy of verdicts. The
77 A bivariate correlation represents the degree to which two items relate to each other.
The correlation is represented by the ―Pearson’s r‖ statistic and ranges from -1 to +1.
Correlations close to +1 and to -1 are stronger whereas correlations close to zero are weaker.
Positive correlations indicate that an increase in one item is accompanied by an increase in
the second item (for example, weight and height). Negative correlations indicate that an
increase in one item is accompanied by a decrease in the second item. See LAWLESS ET AL.,
supra note 68, at 298–99.
78 The correlation between these constructs was r = 0.02, which suggests that there is
virtually no association between them.
79 R = 0.31, p < .001.
A p-value is a statistic that determines the likelihood that the
correlation observed is the result of chance. A correlation is ―statistically significant‖ if the
likelihood of seeing it by chance is 5% or less (as indicated by the p-value as p < 0.05). See
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102
MICH. L. REV. 460, 485 n.117 (2003).
80 R = 0.07, p < .01.
We note that when the procedural justice of the courts is
deconstructed into four elements of procedural justice—voice, neutrality, respect, and trust—
the correlations suggest that those four elements are highly interrelated. While people have
distinguished among the four aspects of procedural fairness that we have outlined, they
generally view them as being very highly related. Hence, it is reasonable to view the fairness
of the courts as a general judgment that combines the four elements of procedural justice.
81 A linear regression analysis is a statistical technique used to evaluate the independent
effects of multiple predictors, termed independent variables, on a measurable construct,
termed a dependent variable. See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 300.

1095_TYLER AND SEVIER (DO NOT DELETE)

1126

Albany Law Review

10/8/2014 1:02 AM

[Vol. 77.3

appropriateness of sentences, however, has a much smaller
influence. The same is true of behaviors that are primarily shaped
by procedural justice judgments, but in the case of legitimacyrelated behaviors, accuracy and justice played a more equal
secondary role.
Table 4 replicates the analysis of Table 3 but with a differentiated
procedural justice model that includes the four elements of
procedural justice: voice, neutrality, respect, and trust. Because
these four elements are correlated, none will appear to have the
strength of influence of a single indicator of procedural justice. 82
However, even within that framework, the results make clear that
all four elements of procedural justice are distinctly important.
Voice, neutrality, respect, and trust all shape court legitimacy, and
are distinct from truth and substantive justice. Interestingly, voice
directly impacts behavior, while trust shapes attitudes, and
neutrality and respect influence both attitudes and behaviors.
Causal modeling can be used to answer the question of whether
fair procedures shape legitimacy because people think they lead to
accuracy and substantive justice.83 The results of that modeling are
shown in Figure 2, which tests the conceptual model shown in
Figure 1.84 The results suggest two conclusions. First, part of the
influence of procedural justice on perceptions of legitimacy comes
from the belief that fair procedures lead to more accurate verdicts.
And, to a much lesser degree, following fair procedures is linked to
the belief that using fair procedures leads to punishing
appropriately. These influences are distinct.
Further, the results suggest that the primary influence of
procedural justice on legitimacy is direct. In other words, the use of
just procedures led to perceived legitimacy directly as well as
through shaping either the likelihood of producing truth or the
likelihood of achieving substantive justice.

82 This is because the explanatory power on the dependent variable is, in a sense, spread
across the correlated point estimates instead of being concentrated in just one of them. For a
more detailed explanation, see LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 326–27.
83 Causal modeling, sometimes referred to as a path analysis, is a form of statistical
regression that focuses on the causal relationship among several independent variables and
an independent variable. For a detailed discussion, see Rueben M. Baron & David A. Kenny,
The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual,
Strategic, and Statistical Considerations, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1173, 1174
(1986).
84 The coefficient values in the second model represent the effects of each variable on
another variable.
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A. Sources of Legitimacy
Demographics. As seen in Table 5, respondent demographics
have very little influence upon whether the courts are viewed as
achieving truth. They have more influence upon whether the courts
are viewed as achieving substantive justice. Higher education and
liberalism are the primary factors that lead to saying that the
courts do not achieve substantive justice. In the case of procedural
justice having higher income, being better educated and being older
leads people to say that the courts are procedurally fair, while
minorities and liberals say they are not.
Personal experience. Only a small group of those interviewed—
139 participants, which is 9% of the sample—had recent personal
experience with the courts. Those respondents evaluated the
procedural justice of their experiences and, as revealed in Table 6,
their judgments were highly correlated. Among that subset of
respondents the estimated accuracy of court verdicts and judgments
about whether the courts generally obtain substantive justice are
influenced by whether participants perceived judges as making fair
decisions using fair procedures during their own personal
experiences. Perceived court procedural justice was shaped by both
whether judges make decisions justly and whether they treated the
person fairly during their recent personal experience.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Is the establishment of truth the same thing as the attainment of
justice? The findings of this study suggest not. These two goals are
distinct. As the summary model shown in Figure 2 suggests, truth
does not influence perceptions of legitimacy by shaping judgments
about just punishment. Rather, truth and substantive justice have
parallel influences on perceptions of legitimacy, with truth having a
stronger direct influence.
While both the extent to which the courts are perceived to
determine truth and the frequency with which they achieve
substantive justice shape popular legitimacy, neither is the primary
factor shaping popular legitimacy. It is the perceived fairness of
legal procedures that drives popular legitimacy, with people
reacting both to whether they believe decisions are fairly made and
whether they think that litigants are fairly treated. That influence
occurs directly, rather than because people think fair procedures
lead to accuracy or produce substantive justice.
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A judicial authority can determine truth using legal procedures
such as a trial. This study suggests that popular legitimacy is first
based upon the view that the courts do establish truth. A judicial
authority with expertise and experience can also establish a fair
sentence.85 Hence, having a third party authority facilitate a
socially superior form of resolution—that is, just punishment—is
less likely to create bad feelings and undermine long-term
relationships. People are less likely to act upon self-serving
motivations when a legitimate authority is telling them in a clear
manner what a fair punishment is. Several findings support this
argument from people who view the courts as legitimate when they
justly punish.
The other key to success as a judicial authority, however, is
relational: people are willing to defer to the solutions an authority
proposes in part because the authority acts in ways that validate
the parties by showing respect for their status and standing in the
group, displaying concern for their views, and expressing a desire to
do what is right for the people with whom they are dealing.
Relational elements are distinct from the nature and quality of the
decision itself and are a separate aspect of procedural justice related
to the parties’ social link with the authority.
This study first finds support for the direct relationship between
procedural justice and legitimacy found in prior studies. It then
demonstrates it is interpersonal treatment that is the key element
of procedural justice, which shapes perceptions of legitimacy. In
other words, while one benefit of fair judicial procedures is they lead
to the goals of truth and substantive justice, it is the relational
elements of procedures that are most central to public trust and
confidence in the courts.
Interestingly, trust in the motives of judicial authorities is
primarily linked to assessments of truth, which are the most
important goal-based influence on legitimacy.
When people
evaluate whether or not they believe that the courts are able to
determine the truth, it is the integrity of judges that is central, not
the nature of the legal procedures they enact. People see truth as
arising from the intentions and motives of judicial actors.
Of course, judicial procedures also involve decision-making and
respondents viewed decision-making concerning punishment as
linked to issues of voice and neutrality. If the courts allow
85

See THIBAULT & WALKER, supra note 21, at 117–18.
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participants to have a voice in the proceedings and make decisions
in rule-based, impartial ways, people believe the courts will enact
substantive justice.
However, this influence is secondary in
importance.
A. Relational Perspectives on Judicial Authority
The courts have the responsibility for articulating appropriate
solutions to conflicts and just punishments for rule breaking. To be
successful in their role, both individuals as judges and the courts as
institutions need legitimacy. The findings reported here reflect the
views of a sample of Americans about the general operation of the
courts, their popular legitimacy, and the effect of personal
experiences with the courts among a small segment of the
population with recent personal experience with the courts. They
suggest that there is an important role for relational mechanisms in
creating and maintaining court legitimacy and encouraging
supportive behavior toward the courts.
Discussions of regulation by the courts often quickly move toward
a focus on sanctions.
However, beyond the ability of legal
authorities to compel obedience is their capacity to encourage
voluntary deference and the willing acceptance of legal authority.
One way the courts can encourage such acceptance is by being
viewed by the public as legitimate. And as the results reported
suggest, legitimacy is enhanced when people believe that the courts
can establish the truth of the matter and can enact substantive
justice. However, this is not the primary driver of legitimacy.
Instead, that primary driver is a direct influence of the fairness of
judicial procedures and, in particular, of the quality of the
treatment that people experience when dealing with legal
authorities.86
While the concept of procedural justice is abstract, the findings of
this study suggest more specific details about the issues defining
the interpersonal aspects of fairness to the public. In particular,
people are concerned about whether they are treated with dignity,
courtesy, and respect when dealing with legal authorities. This

86 Such findings are by no means confined to studies of legal authority. Tom Tyler, Avital
Mentovich, and Sagarika Satyavada recently identified similar concerns in a study of why
people accept doctors recommendations. See Tom Tyler et al., What Motivates Adherence to
Medical Recommendations? The Procedural Justice Approach to Gaining Deference in the
Medical Arena, REG. & GOVERNANCE (published online 2013), http://goo.gl/lziqAd.
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reflects both a concern for evidence of inclusion in the community,
status within it, and respect for rights as a citizen. Such dignitary
concerns are central to people’s identity-based connection to legal
authorities and institutions. In addition, people focus upon whether
or not they have trust in the motives of legal authorities, believing
that they are sincere, benevolent and caring. Those motives are
manifested in taking the concerns of the people involved seriously,
and trying to find solutions that address those concerns and
recognizing their needs in the situation.
These results suggest the desirability of broadening the
conception of judicial authority that is typical of discussions of
judging today. In addition to concerns about communicating the
ability to determine truth and achieve substantive justice, judges
have a great deal to gain from focusing upon building relational
bonds with the people who come before them in court, as well as
with the public more generally. Building such bonds has many
benefits, but the particularly relevant issue here is their ability to
build legitimacy, and through it enhance the authority of the courts.
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Table 1. Judgments About the Courts

Achieve
accurate
verdicts
Enact just
sentences
Act through
procedural
justice
Make
decision
justly
Treat people
fairly

Accurate
verdicts
—

Just
sentences

Procedural
justice

Decision
making

0.04

—

0.31***

0.13***

—

0.27***

0.15***

0.95***

—

0.32***

0.10***

0.98***

0.89***

Fairness of
treatment

—

Entries are the correlation among indicators. *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Table 2. Legitimacy: Supportive Attitudes and Behaviors

Legitimate
Lawful
Share
community
values
Would help
the courts
Would not
engage in
violence

Attitudes
Legitimate

Lawful

—
0.61***
0.63***

—
0.73***

—

0.19***

0.21***

0.20***

—

0.28***

0.25***

0.21***

0.22***

Share
community
values

Anticipated behaviors
Would
Would not
help
engage in
violence

—

Entries are the correlation among indicators. *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Table 3. Factors Shaping Court Related Attitudes and
Behaviors
Attitudes

Behaviors

Courts

Courts

Courts share

Total

Would

Would not

Total

legitimate

lawful

community

legitimacy

help

use

behavior

values
Courts make

violence

0.13**

0.28***

0.05

0.18***

0.17**

0.20***

0.23***

0.28***

0.29***

0.52***

0.42***

0.17**

0.01

0.11

0.40***

0.12***

0.17***

0.24***

0.05

0.13***

0.05

0.06**

0.04

0.02

0.01

0.13***

0.08***

0.14***

43%***

36%***

40%***

48%***

13%***

7%***

15%***

decisions fairly
Courts treat
people fairly
Courts reach
accurate
verdicts
Courts enact
just
punishments
Adjusted R-sq.

This table shows the results of an OLS regression in which the terms are all entered at the
same time. The entries in each column are standardized regression coefficients. The final
entry is the adjusted R-square for all the variables in the equation. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p <
.001.
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Table 4. The Importance of Different Aspects of Procedural
Justice
Courts

Courts

Courts

Total

Would

Would

Total

legitimate

lawful

share

attitudes

help

not use

behaviors

community

violence

values
Voice

0.06

0.08*

0.01

0.06

0.08*

0.14***

0.07**

Neutrality

0.09

0.26***

0.06

0.16***

0.08

0.03

0.10*

Respect

0.17**

0.17**

0.25***

0.23***

0.17*

0.05

0.07

Trust

0.11*

0.07

0.26***

0.17***

0.02

0.02

0.01

Courts

0.40***

0.12***

0.17***

0.23***

0.05

0.13***

0.04

0.05**

0.04

0.02

0.01

0.13***

0.08***

0.13***

43%***

36%***

40%***

48%***

13%***

7%***

15%***

determine
truth
Courts
achieve
justice

This table shows the results of an OLS regression in which the terms are all entered at the
same time. The entries in each column are standardized regression coefficients. The final
entry is the adjusted R-square for all the variables in the equation. *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p <
.001.
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Table 5. Demographic Influences on Judgments About the
Courts
Courts
determine truth

Courts achieve
justice

Courts function using
fair procedures

Hispanic
AfricanAmerican
Age

0.04
0.03

-.06*
0.03

-.01
-.08**

-.10***

0.08**

0.18***

Education
Income

-.09**
0.03

-.09***
0.08**

0.08**
0.12***

Gender
Party

-.05*
0.05

-.05*
-.34***

0.03
-.06*

2%***

13%***

8%***

This table shows the results of an OLS regression in which the terms are all entered at the
same time. The entries in each column are standardized regression coefficients. The final
entry is the adjusted R-square for all the variables in the equation. *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p <
.001.

Table 6. Judgments About Personal Experience with the
Courts

Procedural justice of
decision making
Fairness of treatment

0.79***

Lawfulness of decision

0.83***

0.70***

Entries are the correlation among indicators. *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Table 7. Influence of Personal Experience on Overall
Judgments About the Courts.
Courts reach
accurate
verdicts

Courts enact
appropriate
sentences

Court act
through
procedural
justice

0.34*

0.61***

0.30*

Procedural justice of quality
of treatment

0.10

0.40**

0.29*

Lawfulness of court decisions
Adjusted R-square

0.04
13%***

0.09
10%***

0.16
47%***

Judgments about what
happened in past personal
experiences
Procedural justice of decision
making

This table shows the results of an OLS regression in which the terms are all entered at the
same time. The entries in each column are standardized regression coefficients. The final
entry is the adjusted R-square for all the variables in the equation. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p <
.001.
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Figure 2. Empirical Model
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